In a twist that upends decades of conventional wisdom, a new report reveals that the United States is the largest recipient of Chinese state-backed lending. While Washington has long warned other nations about the risks of accepting loans from Beijing, the tables have shifted: between 2000 and 2023, more than $200 billion flowed from Chinese institutions into the U.S. economy.
According to a comprehensive study by AidData, Chinese state-owned entities provided or guaranteed nearly $2.2 trillion in loans and grants across more than 200 countries between 2000 and 2023. Rather than focusing primarily on developing nations as often assumed, more than 75% of this financing now supports upper-middle and high-income countries.
Out of all countries tracked, the U.S. received the most, more than $200 billion across nearly 2,500 projects. These funds have underwritten a wide range of activities, from liquified natural gas developments in Texas and Louisiana, to data centers in Virginia, to airport terminal expansions in New York and California.
Chinese lenders haven’t just backed infrastructure. They’ve also financed acquisitions of U.S. tech companies. State-owned entities played a role in deals involving semiconductor firms, robotics companies, and other cutting-edge businesses.
Beyond technology, the report finds Chinese capital flowing into critical minerals within the U.S., and into major infrastructure assets like power transmission lines and energy pipelines.
China’s lending has pivoted sharply over the past two decades. While the Belt and Road Initiative once dominated headlines for financing projects in poorer nations, the new data show a clear rebalancing: a rising share of Chinese credit now supports wealthy countries.
Brad Parks, the executive director of AidData, argues this signals more than profit-seeking. According to the report, some lending aligns with China’s broader geopolitical goals, especially in high-tech sectors identified under its “Made in China 2025” initiative.
One troubling finding: many Chinese loans to the U.S. were routed through shell companies registered in places like Delaware, Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands. This makes it difficult to trace exactly where the money ends up, raising concerns about hidden leverage over critical U.S. infrastructure and industries.
In recent years, U.S. authorities have tightened scrutiny on foreign investment, especially in sensitive sectors. But the scale and sophistication of China’s lending and its use of opaque structures pose serious challenges for regulators trying to distinguish benign commercial loans from strategically motivated financing.
This report changes the narrative around China’s global lending. Instead of simply being a financer of developing-world infrastructure, Beijing appears to be using its financial muscle to deepen its foothold in strategically important industries in developed economies.
For the U.S., these revelations raise tough questions: How much of this lending is purely commercial? Where is it giving China influence over critical technology and infrastructure? And how should national security frameworks adapt in response?
The finding that the U.S. is the largest recipient of Chinese state-backed loans is more than just counterintuitive. It is a signal that Beijing’s financial engagement is more nuanced and strategically driven than many believed. While some of the lending undoubtedly serves market interests, the scale and direction of these funds demand a stronger conversation about national security, economic sovereignty, and the opaque structures behind global capital.
